Conversely, as long as prejudicial views of women go unchallenged, they reinforce the silencing of women across our culture as a whole. Efforts to challenge and defuse the power of negative attitudes toward women in privileged contexts, such as philosophy departments, are important not only because of the interests that a small group of women have in being able to pursue careers in philosophy, although this might be considered reason enough to make such efforts. They are important also to the message that is carried out beyond the academy to the wider society, in which the needs of women to have their speech respected and understood by men are connected to fundamental issues of safety and physical integrity. Until women's voices receive the same respect as men's in the elite domains of philosophy and religion, in which the most abstract forms of knowledge and deepest values of our culture are defined and debated, the chance that women's speech will be fully and reliably effective in other areas of life is slight.

References


In his collection of essays, Infancy and History, Giorgio Agamben makes the intriguing claim that "every culture is first and foremost a particular experience of time and no new culture is possible without an alteration in this experience" (1993, 91). This suggests that in responding to the question 'what needs to change?' one answer would be 'the particular experience of time that informs the culture of philosophy'. In many ways, this claim chimes strangely with much of contemporary philosophy, where time is often treated either as an objective phenomenon (as within much of metaphysics) or in its subjective and/or experiential aspects (as within phenomenologically inspired philosophy). Within sociology and anthropology, however, there is a well-developed recognition that our experiences and understandings of time are influenced and shaped by social life. The study of 'social time', in particular, seeks to understand "the ways in which social experience defines the forms, meanings and relevance of time" (Greenhouse 1996, 25). Importantly, while within philosophy, 'public time' has often been treated as synonymous with an objective, apolitical clock time, work in the social sciences suggests that time plays a much more varied and significant role in public life, including in social methods of inclusion and exclusion (e.g., Nespor et al. 2009; Urciuoli 1992) and political legitimation (e.g., Boyarin 1994; Greenhouse 1989; Hutchings 2008; Lloyd 2000). Thus in my work (e.g., 2009, 2011), I am interested in developing a dialogue between philosophical accounts of time on the one hand, and accounts of social time developed in anthropology and sociology on the other, in the belief that this work provides a rich and underutilised body of research that has important implications for political and ethical philosophy, as well as potentially significant challenges for metaphysics.

In this chapter, then, I want to bring insights from the social sciences about the role of time in exclusionary practices into debates around the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. I suggest that part of what supports the exclusionary culture of philosophy is a particular approach to
time, and thus that changing this culture requires that we also change its
time. Importantly, although the naturalness of categories such as sexuality,
and of race, and gender have been widely challenged, the time of social life is only
rarely treated as a normative and politico-discourse within philosophy. As
a result, there continues to be an assumption that social life plays out against
a backdrop of ‘real’ or ‘objective’ time that is itself linear, one-dimensional,
and all-encompassing. However, this is far from being the case, as is demon-
strated in a wide variety of work, in areas such as: political theory (Pierson
2004; Connolly 2005), feminist theory (Diprose 2009; Hesford and Diedrich
2008), post-colonial theory (Chakrabarty 1992; Ganguly 2004), and queer
theory (Dinshaw et al. 2007; Freeman 2010). What this work suggests is that
understanding time as an all-encompassing, linear, immutable succession of
moments is deeply problematic, particularly when utilised in the explanation
of social life. Thus, in this chapter, I argue that assuming that time is the
same for everyone works to hide a number of exclusions produced within
professional philosophy. In particular, such an assumption denies the diverse
and contradictory temporal processes that characterise the profession. I
suggest that linear temporality is only available to certain types of idealised
persons, and as a result should be read not as an objective account of how
things are, but as a normative and political discourse that is supportive of
some while excluding many others.

Ways of thinking about and enacting time underpin a myriad of other
elements of social life including identity, causal explanations, history, social
coordination, and projections into the future. Thus, in order to show how
understandings of time are bound up in mechanisms of exclusion, I analyse
a number of key issues that have already been highlighted as reasons for women's
exclusion from philosophy, in order to draw out the way particular assumptions
about time compound these issues further. I begin with Christine Battersby's
challenge to the notion that embodied experiences make little difference to the
philosophy one produces. Inspired by her critique of the Kantian conception of
space for its male bias, I develop a similar challenge to his conception of time
that helps to illustrate the point that the experience of time is far from
being universal. I then move to the question of gender schemas, particularly
the seeming disconnect between the schemas for ‘woman’ and ‘philosopher’. In
this case, I am particularly interested in the importance of the iterative, rather
than linear, character of identity. Finally, I look at issues to do with the history
and future of philosophy in order to question the way women are continually
refused a place in the flow of philosophy’s time. I conclude by arguing that a
more representative philosophy would be guided by a more complex approach
to time, one that would recognise and actively support the multiple and con-
tradictory temporalities that must be negotiated by the discipline and those who

1. Embodying Philosophy

Despite the extensive work feminist philosophers have produced on the sub-
ject, the notion that the underrepresentation of women is not a problem
because philosophy is supposedly not affected by contingent factors such as
gender continues to arise in discussions on the issue. Yet, as Helen Beebee
argues in this volume, one of the most central tools of analytical philo-
sophy—the notion of intuition—cannot be treated as non-situated or free from
gender bias. Even the ideal of reason itself has been shown to be intertwined
with idealised notions of masculinity and the repudiation of feminised traits
(Lloyd 1993). For Christine Battersby (1998), taking sexed embodiment seri-
ously troubles many of the assumptions that permeate metaphysics. In her
Phenomenal Woman, Battersby argues that identity, space, and time have been
theorised from the vantage point of a particular idealised body. She questions
the pervasive treatment of the male body as the norm, and instead explores
how metaphysics would be transformed if philosophy’s starting point was the
body that could give birth. Importantly, she is careful not to assume that all
women can or want to give birth, but contends that once the embodied experi-
ences of women are taken into account, traditional metaphysical accounts can
no longer be viewed as objective or universal. She suggests that these seem-
ingly logical or intuitive accounts are not derived from a shared experience
of the world, available to all, but are accounts specific to an idealised sense of

In a particularly striking example, Battersby describes the way different
mobilisations of the Kantian account of embodiment (where space is exter-
nal to the self) create a “shock of strangeness”, leaving her to wonder “what
it would be like to inhabit a body like that” (1998, 41). Referring to Mark
Johnson’s and George Lakoff’s work in cognitive semantics in particular, she
questions their assumption that a fundamental characteristic of embodiment is
the experience of boundedness or containment (1998, 40). Instead, she dis-
cusses her own experiences of her body as multiple and fragmented, where different
‘zones’ become differentiated and may war with each other (1998, 44). Further,
extrapolating from interviews with female anorexics who experience their bod-
ies as alienated and threatening, she points out that even the normalised female
body is experienced as permeable and only ambiguously protected against the
‘outside’ (1998, 44–46). These and other examples in Battersby’s work suggest
that the notion that there is a clear boundary between the internal and the
external, between inner time and external space, does not rest upon an intuition
that is immediately obvious to all, but rather only to specific kinds of humans.
As a result, her work challenges the failure of much of philosophy to recognise
the way it has been developed in reference to a very particular experience of
Although Battersby’s focus in the arguments I’ve cited is space in particular, I want to suggest that the Kantian account of time also arguably draws on an idealised account of embodiment. I, too, feel a ‘shock of strangeness’ when I read Kant’s account of time. His assumption that linear time is an intuition common to us all, regardless of language, culture, or embodied experience both ignores the cultural particularity of his account of time and fails to encompass the experiences of many of those within Western culture itself. To summarise briefly, Kant suggests in the Critique of Pure Reason that our experience of time accords with a number of axioms, specifically that (1) all parts of time belong to the same time; (2) no specific moment of time is simultaneous with any other, but is always successive; and (3) that time is one-dimensional (1787 [1787] A31/B47). Like Battersby, I can’t help but wonder what it would be like to inhabit a body that experienced time like that. In relation to my own experiences, Kant’s characterisation of time is profoundly counterintuitive. The problem of negotiating the clash between social expectations around motherhood and professional expectations in philosophy—an issue that is recognised as an important element in the underrepresentation of women in philosophy—provides an illustrative example. As an embodied woman philosopher caught between (at least) two sets of social expectations, each with their own version of which events are significant in my past and future, and their own accounts of which actions I must enact in the present, I am arguably caught between two different times. Because, as I draw out below, the recommended ways of living one’s time for mothers and for philosophers often appear to be in direct opposition. Attempting to fit both into one’s life often produces a sense of time as multiple, disjunctive, and inadequate, rather than one-dimensional and all-encompassing.

The connection between particular modes of embodiment and assumptions about the flow of time was brought home to me quite vividly by a story presented on the “BBC Breakfast Show” in 2009 on the increase of Down’s Syndrome births. In a story in disagreement with itself, the presenters reiterated the common narrative of the failure of women to have children ‘at the right time’ and recounted, once again, the dramatic increase in the likelihood of Down’s pregnancy between the ages of 30 and 40. However, the presenters also touched on an earlier debate over whether the Syndrome births. On the one hand, the apparent ‘punishments’ of mistiming pregnancy were reiterated, and women were admonished not to leave pregnancies until too late. And yet, on the other hand, the presenters appeared to be suggesting that this threat was simultaneously a thing of the past, given the supposedly more positive and supportive environment in the U.K.

For me, these kinds of stories, which form part of the incessant recounting of the dramatic drop-off in fertility rates after 30, create a context in which I, as a female human “tried to a body that could birth”, do not meaningfully experience time in accordance with any of the three axioms Kant attributes to it. First, my experiences suggest to me that all parts of time do not belong to the same time. My time is marked by ruptures. Upon turning 30, I was forever divided from the possibility of being a woman who enacted a timely procreation and instead became the 30-plus woman who can only procreate in an untimely fashion, having spent too much time on selfish occupations such as postgraduate study.

Second, I do experience different moments of time as simultaneous with each other. Specifically, the supposed timely moment in the mid-to-late 20s is also the same untimely moment when pregnant employees and students are given up on by their employers or supervisors as wasted talent. In my experience, there is no right time. Due to the competing messages received from the different institutions that shape one’s life and the diverging understandings of social time implicit within these institutions, a decision I might now make about having a child would be both too early and too late at the same time.

Finally, I would argue that within this context, it is in fact not commonplace to experience time as one-dimensional. Instead, as sociologist Georges Gurvitch argued, “Social life always takes place in divergent and often contradictory manifestations of social time” (1964, 13). As already suggested above, this is because within the variety of social relationships and social institutions that we participate in, time comes to be expressive of different values and expectations. Time is instead experienced as multiple and contradictory.

What I would like to suggest then, is that Kant’s account of the intuition of time and its rules is not so intuitive when one examines the competing times that need to be negotiated within embodied social life. Although I do not have the space here to explore the full implications of this analysis, it raises questions about the neutrality and universality of Kant’s account, suggesting that embodied experience is not external to philosophy, but shapes some of its most central concepts. Further, it suggests that insofar as accounts of time such as Kant’s guide a commonsense notion of public time, and particularly, guide the implicit temporal assumptions that structure institutional life, then they actually work to hide the competing values and contradictions that must be negotiated by those who do not embody the ‘typical’ philosopher. Importantly, as I explore in the rest of this chapter, assuming that time is the same for everyone means that disadvantages faced by philosophers negotiating the multiple and often conflicting times they experience can be read as nonsensical or misguided, or simply go unrecognised.

2. Timing Professionalism

Looking at work already available on the issue of women in philosophy provides further examples of how seemingly commonsense notions of time mask
inequalities within philosophy in multiple ways. The first follows directly from
the above discussion and helps to further illustrate the way the clash between
the health profession’s recommended timeline for mothers and the academic
timeline for philosophers is often unrecognised, or is addressed inadequately.
In her contribution to Linda Martin Alcoff’s collection on women in philoso-
phy, Singing in the Fire, Martha Nussbaum recounts the difficulties of being a
junior academic and a mother. She writes that although the birth of her
daughter created a great number of changes for her, “meanwhile, in the philosophy
department... life went on as if no children existed. Colloquia were routinely
scheduled at five, after the childcare centres closed” (2003: 104). This example is
particularly interesting, because it highlights a form of exclusion that is not
necessarily explicit or deliberate. Rather, it rests on an inadequate understanding
of the way something as simple as scheduling provides a medium for
supporting some ways of life over others. The philosopher whose only key responsi-
bility is to co-ordinate themselves with other philosophers may thus find it very
easy to experience time as a one-dimensional medium that encompasses all their
important activities. However, for those who need to coordinate themselves with other philosophers and dependants and care providers and other
institutions such as schools, sports associations, healthcare providers, etc., time
is multiple and conflicting 1.

Further, although it might seem that an adequate solution to this problem
would be to reschedule meetings at a better time, this is not actually a sufficient
response to the types of inequalities being produced in the clash of responsi-
bilities. To assume so would be to overlook the broader social meanings that are
attributed to time use. Timing is not simply about logistical coordination, but
also signals whether one conforms to a variety of social norms. The importance
of timing in regard to hospitality, gift-giving, or forgiveness provides good
examples of this. In this particular case, one’s use of time feeds into broader
understandings of what it is to be a professional, where the ability to fulfil this
role is bound up with conforming to modes of time use. Specifically, even while
the professional may nominally work according to a schedule, they are nonethe-
less expected to be ready to act in their professional capacity at any time. 2
In a context where one must signal one’s constant availability, to be unavailable
thus comes to be construed as being unprofessional.

Importantly, this does not affect everyone equally, but disadvantages those
more tenuously recognised as professionals because of their deviance from
what is considered to be the norm. As Nussbaum notes, while men in their
department proudly left early to pick up children from hockey practice, she was
unable to do so as her actions were more likely to be interpreted unfavourably

1 For a further example, see Genevieve Lloyd’s analysis of the differing temporal dilemmas
experienced by Descartes and Elisabeth (2006, particularly 309).
2 In relation to the medical profession, for example, see Zerubavel 1979, 53.

Thus, the conflict Nussbaum points to is not only a conflict of schedules, but also a conflict of values and expectations that are bound up in
implicit and explicit social temporal norms. This means that institutional
temporal practices may fail to recognise the way that philosophers with caring
responsibilities may be disadvantaged by being unable to attend certain sched-
uled events; they may also support the misrecognition of this problem as one of
timing, rather than one of being unable to meet implicit temporal assumptions
that guide understandings of professionalism and department fit. This back-
ground assumption that time is the same for everyone provides a good example
of why there needs to be a greater awareness of time as multiple and conflicting
if the culture of philosophy is to change.

3. Iterations of Identity and Causation

A second example of how linear accounts of time may contribute to the mis-
recognition of exclusionary mechanisms within philosophy is bound up with the
problem of identity, specifically the question of who is recognised by others as a
philosopher and who can most easily identify themselves with this role. The blog
“What is it like to be a woman in philosophy?” for example, provides a variety of
accounts of women philosophers being misrecognised as a school administra-
tor, as another philosopher’s girlfriend/wife, or the babysitter. But the failure to
recognise women as philosophers is not restricted to personal encounters such
as these and feeds into the more widespread problem of women’s philosophical
work being ignored or downplayed. As others have already convincingly argued,
these kinds of exclusions arise, in part, because the historical schema for ‘phi-
losopher’ does not map onto the schema for ‘woman’ (Valian 2005; Haslanger
2003; Calhoun 2009). However, a further point to be contributed to the analysis
of this problem has to do with the production of identity itself. As Samantha
Brennan’s discussion of micro-inequities reveals, one’s identity within social life
is not stable, but is supported or undermined by the many small affirmations
or inequities that one experiences in daily life (see chapter 10 in this volume).
This iterative character of identity is not well reflected within a framework that
emphasises the linearity of time rather than its repetitive character. Indeed, what
I suggest in this section is that an understanding of time as one-dimensional and
sequential may be at work in both the failure to notice the micro-affirmations
that support some philosophers’ identities over others, as well as the common-
sense denial of the causative power of micro-inequities.

The question of when one becomes a philosopher, a question to do with
status and recognition, but also a question of timing, might seem to have a
fairly straightforward answer: 'When one has met the generally recognised criteria'. In the case of professional philosophy, this might be once one has completed the Ph.D., when one is first published, or when one has a permanent position. So, from the perspective of a nominally linear social time, where one moment unproblematically follows the other, the shift from student to philosopher should theoretically occur in the moment successive to that when the criteria are fulfilled. However, in the case of 'when does a woman become a philosopher?' time is suddenly not so docile. I have met the first two of these criteria and yet I still feel uncomfortable describing myself as such. This is in no way unique to me. Instead, it appears that for many, the moment when one becomes a philosopher never actually arrives, but either continually recedes into the future or is simply unachievable. As Cheshire Calhoun has written, "While I might enjoy philosophy and be good at it, I couldn't authentically, convincingly, unproblematically be a philosopher. I could study, do, and teach philosophy, but not be a philosopher. (To this day, I almost never say I am a philosopher; I say I teach philosophy)" (2009:219-220).

So, rather than simply happening automatically, the temporal logic involved in 'becoming a philosopher' does not follow the traditional logic of linear time. The linear representation of time suggests that time moves from the past toward the future in a single sequence of non-repeatable moments. However, when it comes to one's sense of self, to one's personal identity, this logic does not really seem to apply. Within linear time, it is logical, for example, to claim that once an event has happened, it will always have happened. However, although I might always be able to say that I had an article or book published, the social meaning of this event is not stable. For this event to be able to be reliably selected as the causal event that enabled me to identify myself as a philosopher, it needs to be supported by a host of subsequent events in which I am recognised as a philosopher by others and treated as such. Without these subsequent events, the original event does not retain the same meaning. What this means is that the temporal logic of identity is not a sequence of non-repeatable events, but its opposite, a sequence of repeated recognitions, affirmations, and identifications. Lack of awareness of these non-linear mechanisms can help to hide the support particular philosophers are able to regularly draw on, as well as the subtle discriminations that undermine the confidence of those who do not fit.

In order to further explain what I mean by this, I want to pick up on Brennan's argument that, in looking for the causes of exclusion, attention needs to be paid to the systematic micro-inequities that operate within professional philosophy. However, as she points out, the small repeated incidents of disrespect, dismissal, and misrecognition are one of the less obvious modes of discrimination within philosophy. Instead, our first instinct when attempting to discern the cause of the problem seems to be to look for causes in relatively self-contained events that can be tied to deliberate agents. We appear less likely to recognise the cumulative causative power of small, repeated acts. Arguably, this tendency is itself based on a certain social understanding of how change happens over time and how to assign responsibility for these changes. Our inability to respond adequately to the massive threats of climate change and resource depletion is a key example of our tendency to ignore the effects of cumulative events. But in regard to the problem of the exclusions within professional philosophy, this tendency appears to hide the way the identity of 'philosopher' has to be actively produced and continuously reinforced. That is, certain iterative mechanisms of identity are ignored because our implicit theories of causation are guided by a model in which change occurs as a result of significant events enacted by conscious agents, rather than insignificant repetitive events enacted relatively unconsciously. Specifically, the micro-affirmations received by certain philosophers are as likely to go unrecognised as are the micro-inequities experienced by others. Further, philosophers attempting to highlight and acknowledge particular micro-inequities can be dismissed as being too sensitive because such acts are not deemed to be significant enough to have really caused any kind of harm. In order to fully recognise this problem, therefore, we need to recognise that discussions focused on micro-inequities are not just about specific events, but also about examining and challenging implicit temporal models of identity and causation.

4. Histories

The importance of recognising the multiple and conflicting times that must be negotiated in professional life, as well as the importance of repetition in affirming identity, come together in the issue of philosophical legacies. Closely bound up with more structural aspects of the discipline, the question of who takes part in the legacy, both in the past and the present, raises issues to do with philosophy's own particular 'social time'. As with the issue of identity above, the institutional structures of philosophy do not follow a trajectory where one moment follows unproblematically from another; but instead work to restrict access to this trajectory such that only some philosophers are able to see themselves as participating in the next 'moment' of philosophy. Donna-Dale Marcano's comments in an interview with George Yancy make this particularly clear. For instance, she claims:

I could never imagine myself as a Plato. And I wanted to. That's a real obstacle.... To want to be Socrates or Plato, or whoever your white male embodiment of philosophy is, may seem ambitious at best or foolish at worst. But it is not trivial, especially for a black woman.... My white male students may never articulate their aspirations to be a Socrates or Plato, and yet it is not unusual for many of them to envision themselves as purveyors of the tradition (Yancy 2008, 165).
Raising issues to do with identity and identification, Marcano is here also pointing toward the way "philosophical time" flows from the past into the present. Again, far from being all-encompassing, as Kant's account might indicate, her comments suggest that within philosophy, the ability to enter into successive moments of philosophy (to be successors) does not occur merely due to the flow of time, but is restricted by the repetitive affirmation of iconic white male philosophers as the true representatives of the discipline.

The limits produced in the present are, of course, bound up with the stories told about 'our' arrival in it. Rather than tell the complex story of a practise that has inspired a broad range of philosophers and philosophical approaches, thus supporting a broader range of 'successive moments', the canon has largely remained a sequential list of well-known white male philosophers. One problem with challenging the exclusions of the canon, however, is that from a certain temporal perspective, it seems perfectly logical. Indeed, a great many mainstream history of philosophy courses fit well within the progressive logic of linear time. This is not to say that philosophical history is itself without disagreements or rifts, but that there is considerable consensus around what the canonical sequence is and who should be included in it, particularly through to the 19th century (see Warren 2009, 5-6). Within this logic, the inclusion of non-white philosophers and white women philosophers can be dismissed as a supplementary move aimed at pacifying critics, rather than being a step guided by what counts as 'good' philosophy. Understanding this kind of practice as an attachment to a particular kind of logic, rather than an objective account of the best philosophers, might go some way toward explaining why, as Margaret Walker has argued, the work of women philosophers "cannot be counted upon to find its way into the permanent record" (2005, 155).

In fact, the seemingly self-evident practise of developing a hierarchical list of 'important' philosophers could also be read as a tool for simplifying the history of the discipline, in line with a particular value set, while simultaneously passing as objective. It thus becomes essential to ask why stories of successive progression seem to make sense so easily, despite the fact that they fail to accurately represent the true diversity of philosophical thought. Importantly, I would argue that such methods of producing history only seem credible when told in a context where time is conceived of as linear progression. When time is instead thought of in its fullness of varying, contradictory processes, a linear story of philosophy does not seem so straightforward. Instead, such a story would be more readily interpreted as simplistic and dangerously misleading. Indeed, to present the history of philosophy in a more comprehensive and accurate manner, we need to recognise the way it consists of multiple traditions with varying trajectories, which cannot be confined to a single canonical sequence. Challenging the way the legacy is portrayed may thus require challenging the implicit temporal assumptions that enable linear accounts to appear as a perfectly reasonable, requiring also that we more fully recognise the way 'commonsense' accounts of time are utilised within methods of exclusion.

5. Philosophers of the Future?

By way of bringing this chapter to a close, I'd like to move from the question of legacies to briefly consider a final theme that arises in literature on women in philosophy—their place in its future. Cheshire Calhoun, for example, has suggested that women are less likely to develop an easy identification with and attachment to philosophy, and as a result, women's understandings of their future possibilities within philosophy are largely not the same as those of male students. One reason for this is suggested by Marcano, who writes that:

"[d]espite the disorientation inherent to one's initial engagement with philosophical discourse, white male students nonetheless have models in their professors and through the authors of various texts to help them find their mastery in the discipline. I had no models and still struggle to find models who can represent my ability to overcome that disorientation (2008, 165-166)."

As suggested above, her comments suggest that the narrowness of the philosophical legacy problematically restricts the possibilities open to philosophy in the present, as well as the future. Although it is undoubtedly the case that ensuring there are more role models and mentoring programmes is important for remedying the inability of many women to anticipate a future within philosophy, the issue I'm particularly interested in here is the way the future itself is conceived within institutional philosophy.

What I want to suggest is that in many ways the discipline of philosophy continues to be guided by a narrow vision of the future that only admits of a particular kind of philosopher. Rather than relating to the future as a force that may profoundly transform it in ways that cannot be anticipated in the present, the discipline stubbornly resists calls to change. The persistent failure of the discipline to recognise its structural exclusions, even while other disciplines have made active commitments to increase diversity, suggests that there is still no anticipation that the discipline may need to reconsider its current trajectories. Instead, the onus continues to be placed overwhelmingly on women to prove that they are fit to be recognised as contemporaries, even while colleagues continue to doubt their capacity for reason, their interest in philosophy, their professionalism, and the status of the issues they research.4 Interestingly, in his Politics of Friendship,
Jacques Derrida has traced the way this notion that women are somehow 'not yet' ready for philosophy has resonated throughout the discipline. He argues that there has been a repeated insistence that women have somehow fallen behind, remain delayed, or simply cannot be thought of as contemporary with men. Analysing the way concepts of male friendship guard the entry to both politics and philosophy, Derrida notes that a wide range of writers, including Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, and Aristotle, presume that women are 'not yet' ready for proper, virtuous friendships, and thus cannot be considered to be suitable politicians or philosophers in the present. He thus argues that "the form or the pretext of 'not yet'" is a key method in the exclusion of women from the public realm (1997, 291, see also 281).

Unlike a number of his other temporal tropes, Derrida does not develop a full analysis of the characteristics and consequences of the 'not yet', but I would argue that it is bound up with an assumption that those 'leading the way' have already forged the most appropriate path into the future. If others are excluded from this future, it is for them to rectify. In this sense, the legacy of the 'not yet' continues into present-day philosophy in multiple ways. If women have a harder time identifying with philosophy and anticipating their future within it, it may thus also be because this future has already been colonised by and for a particular kind of philosopher. Part of rectifying the problem of anticipation that Calhoun points toward is moving toward a conception of the future as unpredictable and surprising, what Derrida calls the 'to come'. This kind of future contrasts strongly with the 'not yet', which assumes a future continuous with the present and so forecloses the possibility that the future might be completely unexpected and transformational. An institutional philosophy that faced up to its continuing discriminations would thus need to begin to welcome the possibility that the future may well be very different from the present.

6. Finding Time

By considering a range of issues including embodiment, professionalism, identity, causation, historical legacies, and future anticipations, I hope to have illustrated why it is important that philosophers come to recognise that the discipline is not situated within a single, all-encompassing temporal process, but rather is characterised by multiple disjointed and contradictory processes. I have suggested that while for some, the work of managing this multiplicity is hidden, by virtue of their ability to fit into certain disciplinary expectations, many more others are disadvantaged by the lack of these implicit support structures. For those who don't fit, the work of being a philosopher includes negotiating seemingly mutually exclusive demands simultaneously, demands that multiply with each further element of exclusion. As Jacqueline Scott vividly attests in an

interview with George Yancy, these contradictions can be so great that simply being fully present seems impossible:

I find myself expending a lot of energy on insisting on actually existing. By this I mean that I am often seen as a contradiction in terms and given that traditionally in philosophy we don't like contradictions, I am either overlooked or they take away the parts that are illogical (having a Ph.D. for example). In order to have my full self acknowledged then I need to insist on the existence of all parts of me. We have talked about the difficulty of embodying the simultaneity of being a woman and being a philosopher, and being black. We see this as a seamless category—maybe there are some seams but it kind of goes together for us in our saner, happier moments. But I think that a lot of people continue to want to put some slash marks in there and say, "We'll allow the woman part but we won't allow the black part." Or "We'll allow the philosopher part but not some of the other parts." And so we need to insist on bringing that together. (My emphasis, Yancy, 2008, 178)

The traditional philosophical aversion to contradiction, well illustrated by a preference for an all-encompassing linear time, risks leaving philosophy unable to respond adequately to the complexities of the world in which it is practiced. Gloria Anzaldúa, for example, has written extensively on the way the Western logics of identity and history are fundamentally unable to deal with the embodied realities of social life. Her work challenges the way social categories (that others use to politically situate her) cut and fragment her own sense of wholeness; because, as Scott points out, to be whole within a traditional Western metaphysical framework is to be without contradiction. As I have argued elsewhere (2011), Anzaldúa's work thus seeks to claim a conceptual space for contradictory identities, in part by challenging linear temporal models that do not allow one to be more than one thing within any one moment. Her work instead suggests the importance of recognising a notion of 'contradictory simultaneity', which resists the urge to separate out differences across time and instead insists that we recognise seemingly contradictory differences within the 'same' moment. Although Scott's comments could, of course, be read in terms of schema clashes, I want to suggest that she is also pointing to a need for a broader conception of temporality. When time is understood to be a sequence of 'news', within which one can only do or be one thing at a time, then the multiplicity and diversity of lived, embodied philosophy is obscured. This again suggests that if professional philosophy is to act on the exclusion of women and minority men, then it will need to rethink the implicit temporal assumptions that guide it.

The key transformation I have argued for is a greater awareness of the problems involved in adopting a 'commonsense' notion of linear time when seeking to understand the complexities of social life. Instead, professional
philosophy needs to be guided by an understanding of time as normative and political, as supportive of certain ways of living over others. In particular, there needs to be a greater awareness of how linear accounts of time, in their pretence of being all-encompassing, actively hide the multiple processes, expectations, responsibilities, and histories that must be negotiated in order for women and minority men to be ‘philosophers’. As Derrida argues in the interview ‘Negotiations’, “there is not an ‘at the same time,’ there is not. period . . . there are simply multiplicities of rhythm. In the phenomenon, or in what has the appearance of ‘at the same time,’ there are already differences of rhythm, differences of speed” (2002, 28). As a result of this, he suggests that in political or institutional action one must not only make several speeds cohabit with each other, one must also enable the multiplicity of speeds (there are not only two, there are more than two speeds) to be rendered, not only possible, but necessary and enable diversities to cohabit in an institution (ibid.).

Understanding the time of philosophy in this way would more easily support the kinds of calls for change that have been made by women in philosophy. A reworked history of philosophy could be seen as more accurate, rather than clearer why the linear pipeline model of increased participation is as woefully inadequate as Eliza Goddard and Susan Dodds point out (this volume, chapter 7). The emphasis on quick repartee in seminar discussions that Beebee and Brennan both critique can also be clearly understood as problematic when we understand that temporalised concepts are not value-free. But above all, a philosophy guided by multiple speeds may be better able to recognise those philosophers who are ‘not yet’ as the philosophers of the future that the discipline so desperately lacks.

References


1. Introduction

To underpin the arguments and discussions in the preceding chapters, we have compiled data from Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Canada. Each country has provided data from different sources. These datasets all have their own shortcomings, and the data are not directly comparable.

However, it is possible to use all these datasets to provide a picture of various aspects of women engaged in philosophy. The emphasis of this appendix is to use the available data to draw out some of the issues.

The situation in Australia is examined in some detail in section 2. Data from New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, and U.S.A. are presented in sections 3 to 6, and finally the issues that have arisen in the discussion of each country are compared and summarised in section 7.

2. Australia

STAFF

As part of its Benchmarking Collection, the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) collects data on an annual basis from university philosophy programmes in Australia and New Zealand. For the purposes of the collection, a programme in philosophy offers philosophy taught at undergraduate and research doctoral levels with discipline-specific staff. Information collected includes numbers of staff engaged in both teaching and research.